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INFANTS' CONTRACTS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT
The growing number of minors having sizable funds of their own to
spend, either because of greater earning capacity or larger allowances,
combined with concurrent growth in competition for such business,'
has posed with increasing frequency problems in the area of infant's
contracts, rights and liabilities.
Before an adult contracts with a minor, he should consider the
minor's limited capacity and the availability of the infancy defense in
suits to enforce such contracts. The defense of infancy is, however,
subject to common law and statutory limitations which may preserve
the adult's contract or property rights. The adult, upon realization
that the ordinary rules of contract and procedural law are often modi-
fied by the infancy of one party, is well advised to use caution in enter-
ing into such contracts.
It is the purpose of this Comment to point out, with special emphasis
on Washington law when available, some of the problems in procedure
and in the special contract rules applicable to the enforcement of
infants' contracts.2
CAPACITY To SuE AND BE SUED
Requirement of a guardian ad litem. When an infant is a party
to a suit in Washington he must appear through a guardian. If he has
no guardian the court should appoint one. The appointment will be
made upon the application of the infant if he is fourteen years or older;
if he is under this age, upon the application of a relative or friend.'
When the infant is the plaintiff, and no application is made, the de-
fendant must raise the issue in his answer, and if it is not so pleaded
the requirement is waived.' Once the pleadings are closed the court
may not dismiss the action for failure to have a guardian appointed.5
When the infant is the defendant, and is under fourteen years, or
1 Note the new teenage credit accounts being offered by leading stores which, while
admittedly not legally enforceable, show an attempt to tap this market.
2 The scope of this Comment is limited by excluding the problems of an emancipated
minor but it should be noted that emancipation does not enlarge capacity to contract.
It simply increases the infant's field of necessaries. 2 WLISTON, CoXTrAcTs § 225
(3rd ed. 1959). The capacity of an infant to appoint an agent or to become a partner is
not considered here.
3 RCW 4.08.050. A similar provision is made under RCW 12.04.140 for justice
courts.
4Blumauer v. Clock, 24 Wash. 596, 64 Pac. 844 (1901) ; Hicks v. Beam, 112 N.C.
642, 17 S.E. 490 (1893) ; 14 ENC. PL. & PP. 1019 (1899).5 Kongsback v. Casey, 66 Wash. 643, 120 Pac. 108 (1912). See RCW 4.72.010(5)
and (8), which provide for the vacation of judgments entered against minors.
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neglects to apply within thirty days after service of summons, applica-
tion may be made by a relative or friend or any other party to the
action.' Failure to have a guardian appointed for the defendant infant
results in the court not acquiring jurisdiction over the infant.7 The
foregoing has led one commentator to suggest that failure to appoint
a guardian ad litem will be reversible error only if the infant is un-
successful and only at the suit of the infant.' Whether prior cases will
continue to be effective under Rule 9(a) of the new Washington Rules
of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, is not yet apparent.
Ex parte Hollopeter' must be mentioned in any discussion regarding
the question of the need for a guardian ad litem for minors who are
parties to a lawsuit. The Hollopeter decision is often cited for the
broad proposition that marriage emancipates a minor male, at least to
the extent that he may sue in his own name. However, the strict hold-
ing of the case was only that a minor husband had standing to apply
in his own name for a writ of habeas corpus to regain the society of
his minor wife who was being restrained by her parents. Whether
Hollopeter would be extended to dispense with the need for a guardian
ad litem in all suits where the minor plaintiff is married is doubtful.
Judgments secured for or against an infant entered in a suit in which
no guardian was appointed are voidable, enforceable only at the elec-
tion of the infant.1"
Service of process. If the infant is under fourteen years of age,
summons must be served on him and on his "father, mother, guardian
or if there be none in this state, then to any person having the care and
control of such minor.. ." [or] if... a guardian has been appointed
for any cause, then to such guardian."' 2 The purpose of such summons
is to provide notice to the parent or guardian and need not be an exact
copy of that served on the minor." When more than one infant having
the same guardian is involved in a suit, a single summons served on
the parent or guardian is sufficient.' 4
Settlements of claims of minors is specifically covered by Superior
Court Rule 93.04W.
6 RCW 4.08.050(2). A similar provision is made under RCW 12.04.150 for justice
courts.
7 Mezere v. Flory, 26 Wn.2d 274, 173 P.2d 776 (1946).
8 Note, 28 WASH. L. REv. 75 (1953).
9 52 Wash. 41, 100 Pac. 159 (1909).
'0 Blumauer v. Clock, 24 Wash. 596, 64 Pac. 844 (1901).
11 RCW 4.28.080(11).
12 RCW 4.28.080(12).
13 Kalb v. German Say. & Loan Soc'y, 25 Wash. 349, 65 Pac. 559 (1901).
14 Morrison v. Morrison, 25 Wash. 466, 65 Pac. 779 (1901).
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INFANT'S CONTRACTS ARE VOIDABLE
The oft-quoted rule that an infant's contract is voidable by him
before reaching majority, or within a reasonable time thereafter, is far
too broad a statement, especially in Washington.
The source of Washington law on this topic is a statute, RCW
26.28.030, which provides:
A minor is bound, not only by contracts for necessaries, but also for his
other contracts, unless he disaffirms them within a reasonable time
after he attains his majority, and restores to the other party all money
and property received by him by virtue of the contract, and remaining
within his control at any time after attaining his majority.
Necessaries. The first "problem word" in the Washington statute
is "necessaries." While the above statute itself provides no definition,
assistance may be found in the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act,
which defines "necessaries" as "goods suitable to the condition in life
of such infant or other person, and to his actual requirement at the
time of delivery."' 5
Expenses for emergency medical attention were held to be necessaries
in McAllister v. Saginaw Timber Co."8 On the other hand, executory
contracts with attorneys are not for necessaries and may be disaffirmed
by the minor." However, after there has been a recovery the attorney's
compensation will be fixed by the court. 8 Moreover, the authority of
the guardian ad litem is limited to the selection of the attorney and the
infant is not bound to pay a specified or contingent fee even though
both he and the guardian ad litem have signed a contract to that effect,
unless the contract has been approved by the court." One exception,
however, should be noted. When an infant contracts with an attorney
to defend him in a criminal proceeding, the infant becomes liable for
reasonable attorney's fees, such defenses being classified as neces-
saries."°
An infant is not liable on an executory contract to buy necessaries,
and if the contract is partly executed the infant is liable only for the
reasonable value of as much as has been performed."
's RCW 63.04.030 (2).
16 171 Wash. 448, 18 P.2d 41 (1933). The court stated that a thirteen-year-old boy
would be liable for emergency medical expenses rendered him as a result of an auto-
mobile accident, even though his mother would also have been liable. But quaere this.
See 27 AM. Jrm., Infants § 17 (1940).
17 Plummer v. Northern Pac. Ry., 98 Wash. 67, 167 Pac. 73 (1917), illustrates
dubious limits within which the attorney must act, since neither he nor the parties with
whom he deals can be certain that the infant will not rescind this authority before a
final determination of the controversy, unless the contract with the attorney has been
approved by the court.
Is Ibid. 20 27 AM. Jm., Infants § 21 (1940) and cases there cited.
19 Ibid. 212 Wm.msToN, CoNTaAcTs § 238 (3rd ed. 1959).
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The liability imposed by RCW 26.28.030 on a minor for his con-
tracts for necessaries is defined by the Sales Act as a quasi contractual
obligation requiring the infant to pay only the reasonable value of
the goods actually received.22
Disafflrance. It is sometimes stated that the infant's privilege
of disaffirmance is for the protection of the minor and not "a sword to
be used to the injury of others."2 Such statements demonstrate a con-
flict in the theories behind the statutes and cases. While an infant,
upon his avoidance, must return all property in his possession which he
has received by virtue of the contract,24 he is not required to make good
any portion of the consideration that has been disposed of, lost, or
wasted during his infancy. 5 The statement in Lubin v. Cowell," that
the right or privilege to disaffirm must not be raised as a sword, should
be directed to disaffimances precluded by RCW 26.28.04027 and not to
those allowed under RCW 26.28.030.
By the majority rule, a minor's privilege to disaffirm is not condi-
tioned upon a showing of any injustice or unfair bargain. This prin-
ciple is illustrated, in Washington by the cases of Snodderly v. Brother-
ton " and Hines v. Cheshire,"0 which allowed the infant to disaffirm
even though the contract was fair and the disaffirmance actually resulted
in injustice to the innocent adult party. However, a strong minority
trend allows the vendor to deduct from the purchase price of the article
tendered back any depreciation or loss of value from use. Professor
Williston considers this the better rule since it would prevent not only
the adult vendor, but the minor as well, from overreaching."' However,
the purpose of the privilege is to protect the infant from imprudent
bargains and since the depreciation of many articles not necessaries
could well be almost as great as the total sale price, Williston's con-
clusion seems open to question.
Brief mention should be made of the special treatment of infants
under the Sales and Negotiable Instrument Acts. Under the Sales Act,"
22 RCW 63.04.030(2). Plummer v. Northern Pac. Ry., 98 Wash. 67, 167 Pac. 73
(1917). See also Note 2 WASH L. REv. 68 (1926-27).
23 E.g., Lubin v. Cowell, 25 Wn.2d 171, 170 P.2d 301 (1946).
24 RCW 26.28.030.
25 Hines v. Cheshire, 36 Wn.2d 467, 219 P.2d 100 (1950) ; Snodderly v. Brotherton,
173 Wash. 86, 21 P.2d 1036 (1933).
26 25 Wn.2d 171, 170 P.2d 301 (1946).
27 RCW 26.28.040 (precludes disaffirmance when the minor has engaged in business
as an adult or has misrepresented his age).
28 Nor does RCW 26.28.030.
29 173 Wash. 86, 21 P.2d 1036 (1933).
so36 Wn.2d 467, 219 P.2d 100 (1950).




the purchaser from the infant's vendee is protected from disaffirmance,
by the infant and the possible resulting loss of the purchased article.
This was not the rule at the common law.8 Under the Negotiable
Instrument Act not only may the infant disaffirm his obligation to pay
when he is the maker of the instrument,"' but he may also disaffirm
his obligations as an indorser."a
DISAFFnMANCE PRECLUDED
Misrepresentation. Some protection for an adult dealing with a
minor is afforded by RCW 26.28.040. Under this statute a minor is
precluded from avoiding his contracts on the grounds of infancy if "on
account of the minor's own misrepresentation as to his majority, or
from his engaging in business as an adult, the other party has good
reason to believe the minor capable of contracting." [Emphasis added.]
The statute does not require both a misrepresentation and the engaging
in business as an adult, to preclude the infant's disaffirmance38
The Washington court has, in at least one case, read out of RCW
26.28.040 the requirement that the other party "had good reason to
believe the minor capable of contracting." In Thosath v. TransporA
Motor Co."7 the trial court had submitted to the jury the issue of
whether, in view of the appearance of the infant, his written represen-
tation that he was twenty-two years of age gave the vendor's agent
"good reason to believe the infant capable of contracting." On appeal,
the majority dismissed the infant's action to rescind the contract, hold-
ing that the written statement of the minor precluded his avoidance and
that under such circumstances there existed no fact issue for the jury
to decide. The four judge minority disagreed, contending that the
statute required at least reliance on the misrepresentation by the adult
vendor. The dissent's position that an estoppel be required to preclude
disaffirmance would seem more preferable.
It is questionable whether the Thosath case still states good law.
Subsequent cases" have mentioned the appearance of the infant as a
factor in determining whether the misrepresentation as to age alone
should preclude disaffirmance. In Stone v. Knutzen, s9 wherein both
engaging in business and misrepresentation of age were involved, the
court stated it was a question of fact for the trial court to decide
s3 Annot, 16 A.L.R.2d 1420 (1951).
s4 BnmroN, BILs & NoTEs § 126 (1943).
s5 RCW 62.01.022.38 Thosath v. Transport Motor Co., 136 Wash. 565, 240 Pac. 921 (1925).
87 Ibid.38 E.g., Lubin v. Cowell, 25 Wn.2d 171, 170 P2d 301 (1946) ; Stone v. Knutzen, 147
Wash. 54, 265 Pac. 161 (1928).
39 147 Wash. 54, 265 Pac. 161 (1928).
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whether the vendor "had good reason to believe and did believe the
infant capable of contracting as an adult." Whether this statement
would have been appropriate absent the engaging in business element,
hence overruling Thosath, remains in doubt.
Virtually every application for credit or purchase order examined
by this writer contained a statement similar to the following: "No
credit will be extended to any person under 21 years of age, or, persons
under 21 years of age must have the signature of an adult. I certify
I am ------ years of age." (Followed by a request for the signature of
the applicant or purchaser.) " Such statements point up the importance
of the unanswered question as to the validity of the Thosath holding.
If an infant certified in such a statement that he was twenty-one or
over, would he be precluded from disaffirming? Would the Thosath rule
be applicable if the infant was fifteen and looked every year that old?4
This problem of when misrepresentation by the infant will preclude
avoidance has been the subject of considerable analysis.4" It would
seem that in the absence of a statute, the weight of authority is that
a minor's misrepresentation as to his age does not prevent his avoiding
the contract he has entered. However, the Washington Legislature is
not alone in providing that a minor be precluded in such cases. Iowa,"3
Kansas, "' and Utah45 have identical statutes. But even so, the courts
of Iowa and Kansas have required actual reliance by the adult party
to the contract upon the misrepresentation or business activities of the
minor to the extent of actual belief that such minor is an adult before
disaffirmance is precluded.46 In other states, absent such statutes, the
decisions are in conflict, various tests being applied to determine when
a misrepresenting minor may disaffirm. 7
40 Applications for credit at a jewelry store, men's shop and two chain department
stores; and purchase orders of a new car agency and a used car lot were examined by
the writer and each amply informed the applicant or purchaser of the age requirement.
Invariably this was done just prior to asking the applicant or purchaser's age. One
chain department store did not have such a statement. For examples, see the statements
made by Lubin and Thosath. See also the application form used by the Washington
Title Insurance Co.
41 What would be the result in the case of a minor who applied for a credit card with
an oil company by mailing the application form often used to "blanket" a neighborhood?
An examination of two different oil company application forms failed to disclose a
statement informing the applicant of an age requirement. One did not even ask the
applicant's age.
42 Annot., 90 A.L.R. 1441 (1934) ; Annot, 18 A.L.R. 520 (1922) ; Annot., 6 A.L.R.
416 (1920).
43 3 IowA CODE ANN. c. 599 § 3 (1946).
44 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. c. 38, art. 1, § 03 (1949).
45 UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 15, c. 2, § 3 (1953).
46 McClure Motor Co. v. Irwin, 137 Kan. 528, 21 P.2d 403 (1933) ; Friar v. Rae-
Chandler Co., 192 Iowa 427, 185 N.W. 32 (1921) ; Szwed v. Morris & Co., 187 Mo. 510,
174 S.W. 146 (1915).
47 Compare La Rose v. Nichols, 92 N.J.L. 375, 105 Atl. 201 (1918), with Sonntag v.
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Engaging in business as an adult. Just what amount of "engaging
in business as an adult" is required in order to preclude disaffimance is
hard to determine from the cases. In Gill v. Parry,"8 the court stated
that where the minorlived with his mother, but prior to the transaction
in question had been employed in various occupations in Oregon and
Washington, and had accumulated $800 out of his wages, paid his own
expenses, and did his own banking, such activity prevented avoidance.
In Russell v. First Nat'l Bank "I the court, in refusing to allow a
disaffirmance of a contract, relied on the minor's many transactions
with the bank and on his personal appearance as giving the adult party
good reason to believe him capable of contracting.
In Stone v. Knutzen, ° the court noted that the minor had been
working sporadically, had a joint checking account with his father on
which he had drawn checks, had previously purchased a car on a
conditional sales contract, and had generally engaged in business as an
adult, and, therefore, was bound by his contract.
In Snodderly v. Brotherton,5' the court pointed out that regardless
of the minor's former business activities, the fact that the vendor knew,
or at least his agent knew, that the minor was not in fact of age made
such business activities immaterial. Similarly, in Hines v. Cheshire,2
the fact that the minor had for several months been dealing with the
vendor did not preclude his disaffirmance when the vendor knew he was
not of age.
While there has been apparently no case where the question was
squarely presented, it should be safe to suggest that as to the business
activities of the minor, an actual estoppel is required in that the activ-
ities of the infant must be such as would normally be carried on by an
adult. Further, the adult party must have known of such activities and
thereby formed an actual belief in the capacity of the minor to contract.
It might be justifiably said that a distinction exists between the mis-
representation cases and those involving business activities, since only
in the former is the infant guilty of fraudulent conduct. But when
analyzed from the standpoint of upon what the adult party may reason-
ably rely in concluding the infant capable of contracting, the distinction
Heller, 97 N.J.L. 462, 117 Atl. 638 (1922). For what would appear to be an equitable
result see Doenges-Lang Motors Inc. v. Gillen, 138 Colo. 31, 328 P2d 1077 (1958).
See also 43 C.J.S., Infants § 27 (1945).
48 114 Wash. 19, 194 Pac. 797 (1921).
49 169 Wash. 430, 14 P.2d 14 (1932).
50 147 Wash. 54, 265 Pac. 161 (1928).
51173 Wash. 86, 21 P.2d 1036 (1933).
52 36 Wn.2d 467, 219 P.2d 100 (1950).
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fails. If there is such a distinction the Thosath case53 may be sup-
ported; if not, it is submitted that the court or the legislature should
take steps to require an actual estoppel in the misrepresentation cases.
The basis for this conclusion is that where the misrepresentation or the
business activity alone would not lead a reasonable man to believe the
other party is of legal age, it would seem preferable to require that
the vendor make the same investigation into the age of the prospective
vendee that he would make into any credit rating or other matter
pertinent to the contract. Moreover, the effect of the denial of the dis-
affirmance privilege in these cases is to hold the infant to full perform-
ance of the contract rather than to require him to pay a reasonable
price for the consideration he has received, as is done in the necessaries
contracts. When considering the underlying principle behind the
privilege of disaffirmance which the common law gave the infant, any
statute in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed.
An interesting problem, for which no solution is offered, is posed by
purchases completely consumed by the infant. Under the statute54 the
infant need only tender back any property he has retained in his
possession. The cases heretofore discussed clearly hold that the de-
struction or loss of the purchased articles will not prevent the minor's
disaffirmance of the contract nor preclude his suit for the return of the
purchase price. But what of contracts under which the infant has
received the full benefit comtemplated, such as contracts for insurance?
May an infant disaffirm after the insured term has expired and demand
back the premiums? If he can, the proverbial "sure thing" gamble has
been discovered. If he cannot, why is this different from an obligation
not a necessary, such as a gasoline bill at the local service station?
Is the fact that the insurance contract is aleatory in nature sufficient
reason for a distinction?55
DISAFFIRMANCE OF LAND CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES
It is often said that an infant's conveyances of realty may be avoided
only after reaching majority. The reason given is that since an infant
may not effectively ratify until majority, neither should he be able to
53 136 Wash. 565, 240 Pac. 921 (1925).
5- RCW 26.28.030.
55 To the effect that the infant may disaffirm and recover back the premiums, see
Simpson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 184 Mass. 348, 68 N.E. 673 (1903). But for a holding
that the infant may not recover more than the cash surrender value see Johnson v.
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 Minn. 372, 59 N.W. 992 (1894). The majority of
the cases in this country hold that the infant may recover all the premiums, Annot., 94
A.L.R. 965 (1935), but the rule is otherwise in England, 6 ENG. RUL. CAS. 55 (1902).
56 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 235 (3rd ed. 1959).
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upset titles until that time. Application of this rule is thought to make
realty titles more stable, an admitted policy of the law. There are,
however, many jurisdictions" which do not follow the above rule and
instead treat realty contracts and conveyances the same as other con-
tracts which may be disaffirmed during minority." The Washington
court has not passed precisely upon the point, but an inference may be
drawn from the language of the court in Kline v. Galland 59 that a minor
may disaffim an executed deed prior to majority. The court said: "He
[the infant] knew all the facts before reaching his majority. He had
executed a deed to ... [the transferee] which he failed to promptly
repudiate." The strength of such inference is weakened by the fact that
the possibility of laches barring the infant's action, because of his delay
in bringing suit after reaching hs majority, was also in issue. It is diffi-
cult to tell whether the court referred to the failure to repudiate
promptly after making the deed or after reaching majority.8 0
A distinct act is required for a disaffirmance, and mere failure to
ratify on reaching majority is not effective as an avoidance." Any act
inconsistant with disaffirmance will amount to ratification, 2 but the
ratification may not be effective until the infant reaches his majority.Y
CONCLUSION
To summarize briefly: First, the capacity of a minor to sue and to
be sued is governed by statutes which indirectly require that for an
orderly and effective judgment, an infant must be represented by a
guardian. Second, under Washington law, an infant who has misrepre-
sented his age or engaged in business, thereby deceiving an adult party
as to his contractual capacity, may not disaffim his contracts. Other
obligations of minors may be enforced only for a reasonable value under
a quantum meruit theory if they are classified as necessaries. Finally,
while it appears settled in Washington that a minor may disaffirm his
contracts for personalty, the ability to disaffirm as to realty before
reaching majority is still an open question. R. TED BOTTIGER
57 27 Ame. JuR., Infants § 39 (1940). See also cases cited in 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 235, nn. 6, 7, & 8 (3rd ed. 1959).
58 Lubin v. Cowell, 25 Wn2d 171, 170 P.2d 301 (1946).
59 53 Wash. 504, 102 Pac. 440 (1909). But see Johnson v. Gerry, 34 Wash. 524, 76
Pac. 258, aff'd 77 Pac. 503 (1904).60 Consider RCW 7.28.090 which allows an infant three years after reaching majority
to recover real estate adversely held during his minority.612 WIus-oN, CoNTRAC s § 234 (3rd ed. 1959).
62 Plummer v. Northern Pac. Ry., 98 Wash. 67, 167 Pac. 73 (1917).
8s 27 Am. Jun., Infants § 76 (1940).
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